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abstract
We live in a digital era where the global community relies on Information Systems to conduct all kinds 
of operations, including averting or responding to unanticipated risks and disasters. This can only 
happen when there is a robust information exchange facilitation mechanism in place, which can help in 
taking quick and legitimate steps in dealing with any kind of emergent situation. Prior literature in the 
field of information assurance has focused on building defense mechanisms to protect assets and reduce 
vulnerability to foreign attacks. Nevertheless, information assurance does not simply mean building an 
impermeable membrane and safeguarding information, but also implies letting information be securely 
shared, if required, among a set of related groups or organizations that serve a common purpose. This 
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chapter will revolve around the central pivot of Information Sharing. Further, to study the relative 
significance of various information dimensions in different disaster situations, content analyses are 
conducted. The results hence obtained can be used to develop a prioritization framework for different 
disaster response activities, thus to increase the mitigation efficiency. We will also explore roles played 
by few existing organizations and technologies across the globe that are actively involved in Information 
Sharing to mitigate the impact of disasters and extreme events.
intrODUctiOn
Information assurance is the process of ensuring 
that the right people get the right information 
at the right time. This term is sometimes used 
interchangeably with information security but in 
a broader connotation, it is a superset of infor-
mation security and also comprise of managing 
relevance, integrity, accuracy, authentication, 
confidentiality and other similar attributes of 
information (Thomas, Ang, Parbati Ray, & 
Nof, 2001). The main thrust of this chapter is on 
Information Sharing, which plays a crucial role 
in mitigating dire consequences of any disaster 
or threat to our social/business infrastructure. 
Here we will be analyzing different attributes 
of information which will also be referred to as 
information quality dimensions in the sections 
ahead and will draw some inference on decid-
ing about their priorities during different kinds 
of disaster. So we will be studying information 
assurance through the spectrum of Information 
Sharing during disasters. It is important to note 
here that the terms disasters, emergency, crisis, 
calamity and catastrophe, all may have different 
meanings in their respective fields. However, as 
a part of this chapter, all these terms refer to the 
same context and may appear interchangeably. 
Similarly, information attributes and information 
quality dimension are both assumed to mean the 
same.
Information Sharing is a fundamental compo-
nent of a successful security program. With the 
high-level of inter-dependent business operations 
among business partners and automated control 
systems, organizations can derive value from 
accessing and sharing appropriate information. 
Nevertheless, doing the same in a secure fashion 
is indeed a daunting challenge, since we have to 
deal with information content that ranges from 
the simple to the complex (e.g., travel records, 
weather information, citizenship records, finan-
cial information, intelligence reports, military 
positions and logistical data, map data, etc.) in 
an interoperable environment that is constantly 
changing (Phillips, Ting, & Demurjian, 2002). 
Therefore, it becomes very important to under-
stand the significance of various information 
attributes during any disaster management op-
eration, because handling information in a way 
that can facilitate the special information needs 
of the particular disaster will expedite the relief 
operations. Our interest is to help disaster manage-
ment organizations (DMO) prepare a framework 
for quick and secure Information Sharing that 
is required in response to a crisis, e.g., natural 
disaster (earthquake, hurricane), terrorist attacks 
(biological warfare or explosions), etc. 
background
In the United States, There are approximately 
30,000 local governments, 30,000 local fire 
departments, 18,000 local police departments, 
15,000 school districts, and 3,400 county gov-
ernments (Pelfrey, 2005). Many organizations 
collaborate together for responding to a major 
disaster; for example during the disaster response 
of 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City, there 
were 1,607 governmental and non-governmental 
organizations involved (Kapucu, 2004). Major 
international volunteer organizations such as the 
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Red Cross and Voluntary Organizations Active in 
Disasters (VOAD) also played an important role 
in mitigating the disaster impact. Incompatible 
technology can be a serious concern for all of 
these organizations. During 9/11 response activity, 
there was a big communication bottleneck created 
between responders from different organizations 
of New York City due to incompatible radio 
systems. The usage of analog radios by the Fire 
Department failed in the same way as it happened 
during 1993 World Trade Center attack (Jaeger, 
et al., 2007). The following excerpt highlights the 
technological barrier to the Information Sharing 
during 9/11 attack:
Firefighters, police, and other emergency person-
nel at the Pentagon and in New York City could 
not find common radio frequencies to communi-
cate—cell phone networks flooded frequencies 
and further hindered information flow in the hours 
following the 9/11 attacks. (Riley, 2003)
The overall coordination and Information 
Sharing was even more concerning during the 
response to Hurricane Katrina. Federal, state and 
local government agencies and private organiza-
tions were very inefficient in coordinating and 
interrelating their activities, lacked an overall 
operational concept and had no proper system at 
place to track and share information (Wise, 2006), 
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff 
told Congress that the response was ‘‘significantly 
hampered by a lack of information on the ground’’ 
(Chertoff, 2005 ) and the White House report on 
the failures of the Katrina response mentioned it 
as ‘‘inability to connect multiple communication 
plans and architectures clearly impeded coordina-
tion and communication at the federal, state, and 
local levels’’ (WhiteHouse, 2006).
In an emergency, it’s generally not possible to 
know all the answers yourself, but it’s quite impor-
tant to know the resource/entities or collaborating 
organization that has the answer. Disasters, as 
we know are mostly unexpected and unavoidable 
events. Today we are aware of which regions are 
prone to tornadoes or hurricanes and where the 
earthquake faults are buried. But what we can 
never accurately predict, with a comfortable de-
gree of certainty, is what path the hurricane will 
take, when the earth will shake, how and when 
terrorists will launch their attack, or where the 
plane will crash. Yet one thing we surely know 
is that when a disaster strikes, there will be a 
pressing need for reliable information exchange to 
take place. How well we are able to manage that 
information before, during, and after a disaster can 
have a direct impact on how well we manage the 
crisis.  So the real essence of Information Shar-
ing is to let the correct information timely reach 
the appropriate receiver, at the right place and in 
an understandable format.  And this is where the 
equilibrium gets lost immediately after the disas-
ter.  All the information attributes go haywire, 
unanticipated delays occur, confusion prevails all 
ultimately resulting in bad emergency response 
decisions and actions.  If a general framework can 
guide disaster management organizations to focus 
on more critical information attributes in different 
types of emergency situations, it will expedite 
the emergency response operations and will be a 
boost for disaster management. Previous research 
in this area focused on describing the emergence 
and development of the disaster situation under 
scrutiny, adopting a case study and qualitative 
analysis approach.  While such studies suggest 
some factors that could influence the performance 
of disaster management operations in the study 
context and offer an insight into the particular 
situation, not many studies have offered objective 
evidence that certain attributes of information is 
critical in a disaster response operations.
infOrmatiOn QUality 
Intuitively and broadly, “Information Quality” is 
the degree to which information meets the needs of 
its users (Gasser & Twidale, 2005 ). Since differ-
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ent people use information for different purposes, 
it often happens that information which is high 
quality for one user is low quality for another. 
For example, when a large-scale wildfire breaks 
out, information about weather conditions is more 
relevant for fire crew and evacuation teams than 
it is for police and Emergency Medical Service 
(EMS).  That’s because fire crew may have to use 
different attack plan to fight against spreading 
fire, while evacuation team need to determine the 
best evacuation path depending on the changing 
direction and strength of the wind. Similarly the 
information about approximate casualty level 
might be more important for Emergency Medical 
Services since they need to dispatch sufficient 
medical resources to the disaster site, while pre-
serving as much medical resources as possible 
for other areas. Yet, it is very important that all 
information that is sent across from one organi-
zation/entity to another is of high quality for a 
successful emergency response.
Quality Dimensions
Information quality as such, unfortunately, is dif-
ficult to observe, capture or measure. Information 
quality dimensions are the means by which we 
can measure quality of Information (H. Miller, 
1996). Several researchers have identified the 
dimensions of information quality with as many 
as 15 dimensions identified by Strong et al. in 
2002. In another research project, a literature 
review was conducted to find out the list of most 
common information quality dimensions (Parker, 
2006). In that study, papers dealing with all qual-
ity dimensions and published during the years 
1996-2005 were examined and the frequency 
of each dimension was calculated across those 
publications. In this chapter, we adopt the nine 
common information quality dimensions identi-
fied by the previous study (Parker, 2006). They 
are discussed briefly below:
Timeliness
Timeliness is the degree to which information is 
up-to-date. It can be seen in an objective fashion, 
meaning that information represents the current 
state of the real world. Timeliness can also be seen 
as task-dependent, meaning that the information 
is timely enough to be used for a specific task. It 
is one of the most important quality dimensions 
for handling disasters, because providing new 
information instantly is a major success factor 
of preventing a disaster or mitigating its effect. 
Information must be timely, and not “stale”. Stale 
information is what has become outdated and 
has been replaced by new information. The im-
plications of untimely/stale information during a 
disaster can be considerable. Not only does it lead 
to the expending of valuable time in processing 
that information, but it also prevents the appro-
priate response needed by the actual situation. 
To enable coordination and synchronization of 
multiple operations, information has to be up to 
date. Quoting an e-mail sent by a White House 
Homeland Security Council officer during the 
Katrina response: 
… sending us very stale sit rep info that has al-
ready been updated (earlier) by the HSOC is not 
as helpful. Is there a way to coordinate the info 
flow so we don’t waste time receiving such old 
data and you folks don’t waste time sending us 
stuff? (Christopher & Robert, 2002)
Also, Timeliness and Accuracy go hand in 
hand. When a situation changes dynamically, 
any situational information that is not timely is 
not accurate.
Security
Security has been identified as another important 
information quality dimension. If information 
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is not secure, it can be easily intercepted by any 
intelligent opponent (e.g., terrorists, criminals) and 
used in a harmful manner. For example, if there 
is a huge fire that needs to draw police, medi-
cal and fire responders from surrounding areas, 
and if a criminal comes to know this, (s)he can 
take undue advantage of this information: (S)He 
can identify which area lacks police force and 
commit a crime in that  area. This information 
quality dimension is especially important when 
there exists an active and strategic opponent (e.g., 
in a terrorist attack situation), as the degree of 
damage that can be done by information leak-
age in such cases can be extremely higher. Two 
aspects of information security include protecting 
information from intentional and unintentional 
human acts (information security) and protect-
ing information from disasters (disaster recovery 
planning). Cyber security relies on logical barriers 
such as data encryption, passwords and transac-
tion authentication, along with human vigilance. 
Disaster recovery planning involves protecting 
information and ensuring appropriate back-up 
and alternate processing procedures are in place 
(H. Miller, 1996).
Accessibility
For information to be utilized in an effective man-
ner, it must be accessible. Accessibility implies the 
degree to which information is available, easily 
obtainable or quickly retrievable when needed. 
But this availability of information to the users 
is generally within the constraints of policy and 
confidentiality. Knowledge of the existence of in-
formation, its availability, and the tools necessary 
to acquire it are key attributes of access (Fuerth, 
1997). It enables Information Sharing, giving an 
impression as if resources were centralized. When 
coupled with timeliness, it permits synchroniza-
tion of interdependent activities. Accessibility 
is an important issue in a disaster situation as it 
often happens that all means of communication get 
disrupted in a disaster. For example, during Hur-
ricane Katrina, the communication infrastructure 
was completely devastated in many parts of the 
affected area, and the responders had very tough 
time in coordinating their emergency response 
operations (D. R. Miller, 2006). 
… It got to the point that people were literally 
writing messages on paper, putting them in bottles 
and dropping them from helicopters to other people 
on the ground. (WhiteHouse, 2006)
The disaster management organizations should 
identify the technical and other barriers limiting 
the access to information during disasters and 
make a cooperative effort to surmount them.
Completeness
Completeness is the degree to which information 
is not missing. Incomplete information can be 
hazardous. However, complete information for one 
person may be incomplete for another.  For ex-
ample, emergency medical services, FBI and Fire 
crew, all may be interested in the weather condi-
tions around the disaster site, but each may require 
different levels of detail. Just as information of 
which precision exceeds a recipient’s processing 
capability may be too accurate, information may 
also be too complete. During a disaster, it’s also 
an adverse situation that the amount of informa-
tion generated is so much that processing it all in 
a timely fashion becomes infeasible. At the same 
time, in a disaster response, if information is in-
complete, it becomes difficult for the responders 
to accurately assess the situation and hence they 
are unable to respond effectively. The following 
excerpt illustrates this situation:
…..Each data set was examined to evaluate the 
completeness of records as a useful indicator of 
quality. The mere recording of the occurrence of 
a disaster with no other information on it makes 
the record essentially unusable for analyses. 




Accuracy is the degree of correctness and precision 
with which information in an automated system 
represents states of the real world. It is a very 
important quality dimension that on which many 
early information quality studies have focused 
(Alexander, 1999; Katerattanakul & Siau, 1999; 
Strong, Lee, & Wang, 1997). Within informa-
tion production processes inside organizations, 
accuracy can be improved by implementing 
institutional procedures, like having information 
double checked by two independent people, or by 
installing technical means, like calibrating sen-
sors or verifying shipping address information 
received through a website against an address 
database. The concept of accuracy implies the 
assumption that information can be captured in an 
objective fashion. Thus, accuracy is not applicable 
to subjective information, like destructive impact, 
public perception or political views. Inaccurate 
information may be worse than no information at 
all. Example, if a fire crew does not know the type 
and extent of situation at a disaster site, they will 
at least try to extract more information. However, 
if they have been given inaccurate information, 
they may respond with inappropriate strategy, 
which may lead to loss of innocent lives. Similarly, 
inaccurate information about the death toll in a 
disaster can lead to pandemonium in public. 
Coherence
Coherent information is what “gels” or blends 
with itself consistently. Incoherent information 
can lead to confusion and panic during a disaster. 
This can lead to wastage of valuable time as well 
as resources. Coherence implies that two or more 
values do not conflict with each other. Informa-
tion generated during a disaster is likely to be 
inconsistent as multiple information providers, 
which might use different procedures to capture 
information, have different levels of knowledge 
and different views of the world. Since most people 
are exposed to information through a number 
of media and from various sources, it must be 
consistent in order to be credible. Inconsistent 
information tends to confuse people and allows 
them to discount some or all of it. For example:
numerous organizations--state agencies, the Red 
Cross, school authorities, and media outlets--in 
California met in the immediate aftermath of the 
Loma Prieta quake just to discuss and agree upon 
the wording all of them would use for the “Drop, 
Cover, and Hold!” message.(Sarah et al, 1999)
Relevance
Relevancy is the extent to which information is 
applicable and helpful for the task at hand. In-
formation must be relevant as per the demands 
of situation, i.e., it must address the needs of the 
end user to whom it is being transmitted. For 
example, when a user calls a 911 operator to 
tell about an emergency, he might tell irrelevant 
details out of panic. The operator must analyze 
what information should be sent across to the 
responders and ask relevant questions to complete 
the information. The key component for informa-
tion quality is whether the information addresses 
its user’s needs.  If not, then the user will find the 
information inadequate regardless of how well 
the information rates along other dimensions 
mentioned in this chapter. 
Validity
Information should be valid in the sense that it 
must be true and verified; it must satisfy the set 
standards related to other dimensions such as 
accuracy, timeliness, completeness and security. 
The most common form of information validation 
is auditing. Auditing can uncover mistakes and is 
a good way to measure the quality of information 
(Whitehouse, 2006). Validity is a resultant rather 
than a causal dimension of information quality. 
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This means that even though some information 
may be classified as being highly ‘valid’, it still 
may fall under poor quality information if other 
crucial dimensions like accuracy, timeliness etc. 
is absent (H. Miller, 1996).
…..When indicators possess high degree of reli-
ability and validity, the data and information they 
generate is more useful in continuously improving 
performance. Conversely, indicators that are un-
reliable and invalid produce confusing, irrelevant 
and useless data and information while consuming 
precious resources.….. (O’Leary, 2004)
Format
Information must be in such a format that it is 
uncomplicated and easily understood by the end 
user. This is especially true in a disaster situa-
tion as minimum time must be wasted between 
information processing and actual response. 
Information format refers to how the information 
is presented to the user. Two key components of 
information format are its underlying form and 
its context for interpretation, which is sometimes 
referred to as its frame (H. Miller, 1996). The ap-
propriate format for information depends on the 
information’s recipient and the information’s use. 
For example, while giving demographic details or 
statistics of any past event, multi-color pie charts 
may be a better format than putting numbers. 
Moreover, during disaster management, if there 
is a commonly agreed upon format for exchange 
of information between two organizations, say 
Fire department and 911 operators, it aids un-
derstandability and expedites the response. Since 
there might be huge data to handle, it’s always 
better to keep them formatted instead of letting 
them go haywire.
For each disaster, too many database and software 
have been developed and designed and millions 
of money has been expended. These projects are 
substantially costly and the main problem are the 
existing of many parallel sub-systems and activi-
ties and repeat labor works in different database 
format which have to be created for each hazard 
management systems. Such methodology will be 
so complicated due to implementation of different 
platform, different database format, and different 
program languages and so on. This will make all 
projects costly and non-efficient. (Assilzadeh & 
Mansor S.B., 2004)
Disaster tyPes
Disasters may be natural or man-made. Natu-
ral disasters include earthquake, natural fires, 
volcanoes, tsunami, hurricane, landslide, flood, 
drought, and so on. Man-made disasters include 
bio/chemical/radiation/fire emergencies caused 
by human error or by strategic opponents (e.g., 
terrorists) and so on. Whatever may be the disaster 
type, it needs adequate and timely response by 
several government agencies that interact and 
exchange information with each other to combat 
the disaster. In order to make the study more 
manageable, in current context, we limit our scope 
to hurricanes, earthquakes, and terrorist attacks. 
Disaster cases analyzed
We have focused on the below disasters:
1. Katrina Hurricane: It was the third most 
intense United States (U.S.) land-falling hur-
ricane on record based on central pressure. 
The catastrophic damage and loss of life 
inflicted by this hurricane is an estimated 
1,353 direct fatalities and 275,000 homes 
damaged or destroyed. Total economic losses 
could be greater than $100 billion (Grou-
mann, Houston, & Lawrimore, 2005). 
2. Indian Ocean Earthquake (and resulting 
Tsunami): It originated with an epicenter 
off the west cost of Sumatra, Indonesia on 
December 26, 2004. It killed an estimated 
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350,000 people and caused losses worth US 
$4.45 billion (Athukorala & Resosudarmo, 
2005) 
3. 9/11 Attacks: It occurred on September 11, 
2001 when a series of suicide bombings using 
hijacked commercial air-liners hit several 
strategic US locations. The attacks killed 
more than 2,600 people (9/11 Commission 
report, 2005) and caused economic losses in 
NYC worth US $83-$95 billion (Thompson, 
2002). 
4. Anthrax Attacks: During the fall of 2001, 
mail packages containing large numbers 
of Bacil lus anthracis spores were sent to 
people at several locations in the US. 22 
people got seriously infected and five of them 
died. As many as 30,000 people in the U.S. 
Postal Service (USPS) initiated preventive 
antibiotic treatment (Alibek, Lobanova, & 
Popov, 2005 ).
We selected the above mentioned four cases 
for our research because they not only caused 
loss of human life and capital, but also grabbed 
widespread public and media attention in the 
recent past. Out of these, Tsunami and Hurricane 
Katrina are natural disasters and 9/11 attacks 
and Anthrax attacks are man-made. Therefore, 
our findings will also help in distinguishing 
the relative significance of information quality 
dimensions during disaster management in both 
of these kinds of disasters.
Before we proceed with content analysis, let us 
make a few statements about expected relation-
ships between the above mentioned information 
quality dimensions and one or more types of 
the disasters examined in the content analysis. 
Security will be obviously more important in 
the two terrorist attacks (9/11 and Anthrax at-
tacks) than in the other two disasters, because 
strategic opponents are present. Accessibility 
will be more important in disasters where com-
munication infrastructure is damaged. Therefore, 
we can expect that media articles about larger-
scale disasters like Katrina and Tsunami would 
put more weight on the accessibility dimension, 
compared with other types of disasters of which 
damages were isolated within a relatively small 
geographical area (e.g., a city) or did not disrupt 
telecommunication networks. Timeliness will 
be more important when the threat situation in a 
disaster develops dynamically and at a fast phase. 
Thus, logically, media reports about 9/11 and the 
Tsunami should emphasize timeliness more than 
reports about the Anthrax attack.
cOntent analysis
In order to be able to quantify the information 
quality attributes so that they can be compared to 
determine their relative importance in a disaster 
situation, we used a semantic content analysis 
approach. Content analysis is a research method 
by means of which the presence of certain words 
or concepts within a given text can be determined 
(Busch, et al., 2005). Holsti (1969) broadly defines 
content analysis as, “any technique for making 
inferences by objectively and systematically iden-
tifying specified characteristics of messages”. This 
tool can be used to predict the content and meaning 
of the text or article under consideration. 
In our research, we used CATPAC as content 
analysis software. CATPAC is a self-organizing 
artificial neural network computer program that 
has been optimized to read and analyze large 
amounts of text (Kim, Song, Braynov, & Rao, 
2005). This program identifies the most frequently 
occurring concepts in a given text which can be 
interpreted as a measure of importance, atten-
tion, or emphasis of that concept (Krippendorff, 
1980).
Document corpus construction
Since we wanted to predict the importance of 
information quality dimensions during a disaster 
response, we collected several journal articles and 
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news items relating to emergency response of each 
disaster event under scrutiny. The articles were 
collected from comprehensive databases such as 
Academic Search Premier, MasterFILE Premier, 
InfoTrac Newspapers, LexisNexis Academic, and 
Factiva. After a manual inspection to assure rel-
evance, we selected 50 media and journal articles 
to conduct a semantic content analysis. The list 
of these articles has been included in Appendix 
A at the end of this chapter.
semantic analysis to identify 
Keywords
We created a list of keywords (Table 1) which 
represent each quality dimension (semantically 
equivalent categories). We included several syn-
onyms while creating the list of keywords for each 
dimension, considering the fact that authors may 
use synonyms for stylistic reasons throughout a 
document – if only a single word is used to do 
content analysis, it can lead us to underestimate 
the importance of a concept (Weber, 1990). For 
example, an author might use the word ‘available’ 
or ‘reachable’ or ‘accessible’ while talking about 
the ‘accessibility’ aspect of information, and so, 
we need to consider all three words while doing 
a content analysis. Similarly, the author might use 
the word ‘inaccessible’ or ‘unavailable’ and still 
be talking about ‘accessibility’ (rather, inacces-
sibility) aspect of information. As a result, our list 
of keywords includes both synonyms as well as 
antonyms to represent a quality dimension. While 
we understand the limitation that every keyword 
in each category may not represent that category 
equally well, there is no well-defined procedure 
to assign the weight of each word (Stemler, 2001). 
Consequently, we proceeded with our research 
under the assumption that all keywords for an 
information quality dimension (i.e., category) are 




Timeliness timeliness, delay, delays, time, timely, timelines, immediate, 
immediately, late, early, prompt, slow, fast, speed, waiting, prolonged, 
expedite, expedited
Security safe, unsafe, secure, security, threat, threats, threaten, risk, risks, 
violence, crime, criminal, lawlessness, terrorism, terrorist, protection, 
protect, protected
Accessibility accessible, inaccessible, communication, communicate, 
communicating, reach, reached, coordination, coordinate
Completeness incomplete, complete, adequate, inadequate, unknown, unaware, 
insufficient, integrity, wholeness, entirety
Accuracy accurate, inaccurate, accurately, confirmed, uncertainty, uncertain, rely, 
reliable, relied, wrong, false
Coherence coherent, inconsistent, ambiguous, confusion, conflicting, uniform, 
concrete, consistent
Relevance relevant, irrelevant, useless, useful, lengthy, redundant, applicable, 
applicability, cogency, pertinence
Validity valid, validated, invalid, obsolete, outdated, substantiate, substantiated, 
unsubstantiated, credible, warrant, warranted, unwarranted





We then conducted a content analysis of the articles 
using CATPAC and summed up the frequency of 
words for each dimension, with frequency counts 
determining the relative concern of each dimen-
sion. Also, in order to ensure that we did not miss 
any high frequency keyword that could possibly 
represent an information quality dimension, we 
reviewed all high frequency words in content 
analysis results. Any word that we found was 
highly correlated and semantically similar to an 
existing keyword was added to our list, and then 
the results were revised accordingly. 
Total number of content bearing words for the 
four disaster cases came out to be:
1. Hurricane Katrina: 4062
2. Tsunami (Indian Ocean Earthquake): 778
3. 9/11 Attacks: 4995
4. Anthrax Attacks: 4082
Since most of the articles analyzed in this 
study were published in the US, we can see that 
the total number of content bearing words in 
Tsunami is relatively less than those in the other 
cases. Nevertheless, the total word count will not 
have any impact in determining relative impor-
tance because we are measuring the hit density 
of keywords belonging to different information 
quality dimensions within a particular disaster.
filtering ambiguous Words
Simple frequency of words may not actually 
represent the importance of each dimension as 
words can have multiple meanings or appear in 
multiple contexts. For example the word “uniform” 
can have a noun meaning “clothing”, an adjective 
meaning “evenly spaced”, or an adverb mean-
ing “provide with uniform”. In order to resolve 
the ambiguity in the context in which the words 
appeared, we used the Key Word In Context 
(KWIC) search to test for the consistency of word 
usage. We used HyperRESEARCH to pull up 
the sentences in which the keywords were used 
to perform a validation of our results (Stemler, 
2001). HyperRESEARCH is a software package 
that assists collection and analysis of qualitative 
data. We reduced the word count wherever we 
found that the context where the word appeared 
was not ‘information’ or ‘information quality’ 
related.
hit Density
Since the length of articles varied, the absolute 
number of keywords appearing in the corpus 
thus did not represent the actual relevance of 
each dimension. Therefore, we calculated the 
‘hit-density’ of keywords corresponding to each 
information attribute. The hit density is a ratio 
of the number of hits divided by the number of 
content-bearing words in an article (Efthimiadis, 
1993). Here we define the term ‘hits’ as the number 
of words corresponding to the quality attribute 
under consideration, and ‘number of content 
bearing words’ as the total number of words that 
represent all quality attributes for a given disaster 
situation. For example, the number of words as-
sociated with the dimension ‘accessibility’ for the 
disaster Katrina was 1,431, while the total number 
of words obtained by summing up word count for 
all dimensions for disaster Katrina was 4062. The 
hit density is 1,431/4,062, i.e., 35. Accordingly, a hit 
density index that represents the importance of an 
information quality dimension can be compared 
with those of other dimensions within a disaster 
as well as across all disaster cases. The results of 
hit density analysis are graphically represented 
in Figure 1 to facilitate sense making and easy 
reading of the results. 
From the hit density analysis results, we can 
observe several interesting differences within and 
across different types of disasters. 
1. Security is, by far, the most important issue 
in terrorist attacks (i.e., Anthrax and 9/11at-
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tacks), while it still remains as the 2nd and 
3rd important dimension in Tsunami and 
Katrina cases respectively. We can induce 
from this result that existence of an active 
intelligent opponent (e.g., terrorist) can force 
stakeholders (e.g., emergency responders, 
potential victims) to maintain a high-level of 
information security during emergency re-
sponse operations. If information is insecure, 
it could easily be intercepted and misused to 
spread more terrorism. However, even when 
there is no immediate threat from intelligent 
opponents, security seems to remain as an 
important concern to many stakeholders 
(e.g., victims, the public, government agen-
cies, non-government relief organizations), 
because a large-scale disaster will inevitably 
involves exchange of sensitive information 
across different organizations with different 
security requirements.
2. Timeliness was the most important issue in 
the Tsunami case (35%) and the 2nd most 
important issue, with almost equal levels 
(22-25%), for the other cases. It is obvi-
ous that if information does not reach the 
responders in time, they will not be able to 
respond before irrevocable and serious dam-
ages have already been done. One possible 
explanation of the relatively high level of 
the hit density in the Tsunami case may be 
the time lag between the earthquake and 
the strikes of tsunami at different regions, 
because effective and timely warning might 
allow potential victims to evacuate or mini-
mize the damages. In addition, the extremely 
higher number of casualty, as the death toll 
(350,000) suggests, could require timely 
responses to save valuable, yet perishing 
lives. 
3. Accessibility was the most important issue 
in Katrina (35%), and the 3rd most impor-
tant issue in all the other cases (9-18%). 
However, the gap between Katrina and 
the other cases are quite obvious, unlike 
the timeliness dimension. We suspect that 
the unexpected scale of damages on the 
once-reliable communication infrastructure 
could cause the surge of emphasis on acces-
sibility. Also, the number and the variety of 
organizations involved in the relatively long 
recovery period, together with the level of 
bureaucracy imposed by the hierarchical 
Figure 1. Hit density analysis
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structure of the US disaster management 
agencies could result in accessibility issues 
among different stakeholders. 
4. All the other dimensions (i.e., accuracy, 
coherence, completeness, format, relevance, 
and validity) are much less emphasized 
(mostly below 5%), regardless of the types 
of disaster, than the three most important 
dimensions (i.e., accessibility, security, 
timeliness). While it is still much lower than 
the other dimensions, the hit density of com-
pleteness in the Katrina case is distinctively 
higher than those in the other disasters. This 
may also result from disruption of commu-
nication and transportation systems, as well 
as reliance on archival systems that became 
unavailable by the impact of the disaster.  One 
important point to make clear is that the low 
levels of these dimensions do not necessarily 
mean these are not important dimensions. 
We assume that published articles reflect 
the current issues in the respective context. 
Therefore, we can consider the three most 
important dimensions (i.e., accessibility, 
security, and timeliness) as the ones that 
became the center of hot discourse because 
we have misunderstood their impacts, result-
ing in mis-configured disaster management 
systems. 
From the results of the comparative analyses 
of information quality dimensions in different 
disaster situations, we can conclude that these 
dimensions hold varying significance across dif-
ferent disasters. We can also infer some factors that 
might influence the differences in the importance 
levels of the three most important dimensions. 
Therefore, it is recommended that information 
be exchanged between different organizations 
on the basis of the circumstances and resulting 
relative significance of these information quality 
dimensions. The prioritization process which can 
be created utilizing these results will certainly 
help the emergency response operation to focus 
on the information quality dimension which 
matters the most and thus will reduce the impact 
of disaster significantly by expediting the relief 
operations. Moreover, this will save time and 
resources which get dissipated dealing with less 
significant dimensions and thus can be utilized 
in the right direction to respond to the disaster 
in a better way.
In the previous sections, we discussed the 
important attributes of information. Taking the 
information security aspect a step further, let us 
continue our research to analyze the aspects of 
information assurance. We will perform content 
analysis to explore the relative significance of 
different dimensions of information assurance to 
provide us with more valuable conclusions which 
can be utilized to build a prioritization framework 
in mitigating disaster impacts.
information assurance
Information assurance is often used interchange-
ably with information security. But in specific 
terms, information assurance can be defined as 
information operations that protect and defend 
information and information systems by ensur-
ing their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes 
provision for restoration of information systems by 
incorporating protection, detection and reaction 
capabilities (Maconachy, V., Schou, Ragsdale, 
& Welch, 2001). At the heart of Information 
assurance is the provisioning of five security 
services: Availability, Integrity, Authentication, 
Confidentiality, and Non-Repudiation which we 
are considering as the five important dimensions 
of information assurance.
1. Availability can be defined as timely, reli-
able access to data and information services 
for authorized users. It means that the in-
formation, the computing systems used to 
process the information, and the security 
controls used to protect the information 
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are all available and functioning correctly 
when the information is needed. Often it is 
viewed as a function, which is not entirely 
security related. Availability is equated 
with information system operations such 
as redundant communication channels, 
back-up power and off-site capabilities to 
handle crisis. Availability is the utility part 
of security services. There may be times 
during the course of operations that demand 
system availability at the expense of the other 
security services. The decision to abandon 
the other security services is a risk mitigation 
decision often driven by threats and vulner-
abilities that fall beyond the system security 
parameters. Broadcasting a decision or some 
critical information at the time of disaster, 
to handle a life-threatening condition may 
override concerns to do so in a totally secure 
fashion (Maconachy, et al., 2001).
2. Integrity is “the quality of an information 
system reflecting logical correctness and 
reliability of an operating system; the logical 
completeness of the hardware and software 
implementing the protection mechanisms; 
and the consistency of the data structures and 
occurrence of the stored data.” (Lohse et al, 
2003). It means that data cannot be created, 
changed, or deleted without authorization. 
In a formal security mode, integrity is 
interpreted more narrowly to mean protec-
tion against unauthorized modification or 
destruction of information. Data integrity is 
a matter of degrees of trust. Integrity must 
include the elements of accuracy, relevancy, 
and completeness. Data and system integrity 
implies robustness. 
3. Authentication is a security service, “de-
signed to establish the validity of a transmis-
sion, message, or originator, or a means of 
verifying an individual’s authorizations to 
receive specific categories of information” 
(Maconachy, et al., 2001). Authentication 
provides a foundation for many security 
services by ensuring that data, transactions, 
communications or documents (electronic 
or physical) are not exposed to unauthor-
ized entities thereby giving them a chance 
to tamper or misuse them.
4. Confidentiality is “the assurance that in-
formation is not disclosed to unauthorized 
persons, processes or devises” (Maconachy, 
et al., 2001). The application of this security 
service implies information labeling and 
need-to-know imperatives are aspects of the 
system security policy. Information that is 
considered to be confidential in nature must 
only be accessed, used, copied, or disclosed 
by persons who have been authorized to do 
so, and only when there is a genuine need 
to do so. A breach of confidentiality occurs 
when information that is considered to be 
confidential in nature has been, or may have 
been, accessed, used, copied, or disclosed 
to, or by, someone who was not authorized 
to have access to the information.
5. Non-Repudiation refers to the assurance 
that “the sender of the data is provided with 
proof of delivery and the recipient is provided 
with proof of the sender’s identity, so neither 
can later deny having processed the data” 
(Fry, 2001). Non-repudiation has ramifica-
tions for electronic commerce as well as 
battlefield orders. Electronic commerce 
uses technology such as digital signatures 
and encryption to establish authenticity and 
non-repudiation.
Now let us do the content analysis of above 
five mentioned dimensions by using the keywords 
described below in Table 2, across all the four 
disasters. Our research approach is the same as 
we did in the previous content analysis.
After doing content analysis across all the four 
disasters, we calculated the hit density, as done 
in the previous section, and plotted them on the 
bar chart as shown below in Figure 2:
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From the result of the above content analysis, 
we can draw the following conclusions:
1. Confidentiality was the dominant concern 
in 9/11 attack (64%), while it was the 2nd 
most important issue in the other disasters 
(31-38%). Interestingly, this attribute was not 
as much emphasized in the other terrorist 
attack case (i.e., anthrax attacks) as it was 
in 9/11. This difference between the two 
types of terrorist attack cases may come 
from the nature of attack. In 9/11, the attack 
was carried within a relatively short period 
of time, and nothing was clear at the point 
of attack, from which the US intelligence 
community had to figure out what really 
happened and how to handle the situation, 




Availability Available, accessibility, accessible, inaccessible, communication, 
communicate, communicating, reach, reached, unavailable, 
availability, unavailability 
Integrity Completeness, wholeness, relevance, accuracy, incomplete, complete, 
adequate, inadequate, insufficient, Tamper, tampering, repudiate, 
manipulate, integrity
Authentication Valid, genuine, certify, attest, evidence, validity, authenticity, 
authenticate, authenticated, authenticates, manifest, manifestation, 
authentication
Confidentiality Privacy, secret, secrecy, private, classified, confidential, 
confidentially, conceal, concealed, covert, covertly, unacknowledged, 
confidentiality
Non-Repudiation Reject, disown, renounce, repudiate, encryption, decryption, 
time-stamp, time-stamped, signature, unfair, disclaimer, disclaim, 
repudiation, non-repudiation
Table 2. Content analysis keywords
Figure 2. Hit density analysis
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public needs to know. On the other hand, 
the anthrax case involved multiple attacks 
that aimed at seemingly random targets. 
Therefore, the public, as a group of individu-
als who may become a victim of the next 
attack had to be informed, educated, and 
mobilized, in order to minimize the impact 
of the attacks and maximize the chance to 
catch the attacker by encouraging bottom-up 
information flow for terrorist investigation 
tips, in the anthrax case. Therefore, it’s very 
important to assure confidentiality of any 
information that has a potential to have a 
negative consequence, should the informa-
tion fall in the hands of active opponents, 
while confidentiality should give a way to 
availability (or some other attributes) if the 
situation requires cooperation from other 
relief agencies or the public.
2. In contrast to confidentiality, Availabil-
ity was a more important attribute in the 
Anthrax attack (46%), Katrina (51%), and 
Tsunami (47%) cases. It took 20% of the 
content-bearing words in the 9/11 case, 
which is a smaller portion, but still the 
2nd important dimension. This may reflect 
issues like inconsistent access control for 
inter-organizational Information Sharing, 
lack of redundancy in communication 
links, absence of good backup practice, and 
improper business continuity planning for 
disaster management operations.  The results 
show that confidentiality and availability 
are two most critical information quality 
dimensions, together taking a major portion 
(79 -89%) of the content-bearing information 
security words in the four disaster cases. The 
hit densities of Authentication, Integrity, 
and Non-Repudiation were relatively low, 
suggesting that these dimensions were less 
of concern in the studied disasters. Non-
repudiation appears especially irrelevant 
to the disaster management situation.
The results obtained can be utilized by govern-
ment and non-government disaster management 
organizations to align their relief operations more 
effectively, by devising special mechanism to take 
care of every mentioned information attribute as 
per their significance. There are different organi-
zations which are involved in different types and 
stages of disaster management operations. Among 
other information assurance attributes, they tend 
to focus on availability and confidentiality of 
information. The results suggest that availabil-
ity is the most important information assurance 
dimension in the disaster management context, 
unless the situation requires confidentiality (e.g., 
information about the situation may benefit strate-
gic opponents), in which case confidentiality may 
become the dominant dimension of information 
assurance quality over the usual golden rule of 
“availability goes first”. 
In Appendix B, we will touch upon a few 
of organizations and technologies that can help 
disaster management organizations achieve ap-
propriate levels of availability and confidentiality 
for information assurance, while accommodating 
relevant information quality dimensions (e.g., 
accessibility, security, timeliness), in a disaster 
response situation. By utilizing these organiza-
tional and technological supports, relief agencies, 
esp. those who often participate in large-scale, 
multi-agency disaster management operations, 
will be able to better prepare for and improve their 
performance in different types of disasters.
cOnclUsiOn
In a disaster, every moment counts. A single 
minute saved can save a large number of lives, 
and thus it is very important to utilize time in the 
most efficient manner during the disaster response 
operations. Unfortunately, the situation often 
goes haywire immediately after the disaster, and 
the relief operations do not necessarily go in the 
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planned manner, giving rise to chaos all around 
and thus information quality suffers. There exists 
an urgent need for a prioritization framework on 
the basis of which information quality dimensions 
can be weighed and their relative significance 
used to orient the emergency response operations. 
In this chapter, we have reviewed nine informa-
tion quality dimensions, which led us to deduce 
relative significance of some of the information 
attributes across different disaster types. Based 
on the results of our content analyses, this chapter 
provides empirical evidence that effective disaster 
management requires a right mix of informa-
tion quality dimensions to be achieved in their 
communication, depending on the particular 
circumstances of the disaster. We also discussed 
several key organizations and technologies that 
can promote information assurance in disaster 
management and improve various aspects of 
information quality.
The results of our analysis suggest that security 
is one of the most important information quality 
dimensions for all types of disaster management, 
but a much higher level of information security 
must be provided when an active intelligent op-
ponent (e.g., terrorist) may take advantage of the 
information about the situation. Timeliness is 
another very important attribute for all disaster 
types, but it may gain weight when there is a 
time lag between a sign of potential damage (e.g., 
ocean earthquake, request for an ambulance) and 
actual strike of the disaster (tsunami reaching a 
coastline, death of a life), during which potential 
victims or emergency responders can be prepared 
to minimize the impact. Disaster responders 
should pay more attention to accessibility if they 
need to respond to a disaster that affected a large 
geographical area. Interestingly, all the other di-
mensions included in our analysis did not receive 
much attention in the four disaster cases. 
The chapter further analyzed 5 sub-dimen-
sions of the information security dimension, one 
of the three hottest issues in the current disaster 
management communications. The results that 
we have obtained thus can be used by public and 
private sector disaster management organizations 
to create an information dissemination prioritiza-
tion framework when responding in an emergency 
situation. Such a framework will aid decision-
making when communicating information across 
organizations during a disaster. For example, 
agencies will know when to wait for information 
to get ‘complete’ while it is still ‘secure,’ and when 
to ensure that information is ‘secure’ while it is 
still ‘complete,’ and so forth. 
While mostly in tandem with our predictions, 
the results of the content analyses also call for 
more research in this area. For example, a fol-
low-up study may identify different dimensions 
of disasters (e.g., geographical and time span 
of the impact/recovery, number of involved re-
sponders/relief agencies, changes in the casualty 
at each phases of the disaster), which will allow 
more systematic analysis of possible relationships 
between information attributes and disaster at-
tributes. Similarly, research on organizational 
attributes of disaster management organizations 
is highly likely to improve our understanding on 
the relative importance of information attributes. 
Also, the importance of various information 
quality dimensions can be measured on a single 
reference frame, which will allow direct compari-
son of the absolute value of the attributes. From 
a citizen-centric view point, analyzing personal 
web blogs or comments on first responder websites 
to understand the relative value of G2C (Govern-
ment to Citizens) disaster communications will 
also be a meaningful research avenue. As such, 
we believe that our findings and discussions in 
this chapter can provide a fertile ground for future 
studies in the field of disaster management and 
information security. 
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aPPenDix b: OrGanizatiOnal anD technOlOGical resOUrces 
United states computer emergency readiness team (Us-cert)
A partnership between Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and public and private sector or-
ganizations, US-CERT is charged with improving cyber security preparedness and response in the 
United States. Through US-CERT, companies can access valuable educational resources, find up-to-
date security information and receive security alerts. Individual companies are encouraged to register 
with them to receive alerts, warnings and other cyber security related information that is relevant to 
company-specific technology.
Cyberspace is a combination of distinct information infrastructures, including government and 
business operations, emergency preparedness communications, and critical digital and process control 
systems. Protecting these systems is very important to the resilience and reliability of the Nation’s criti-
cal infrastructures and key resources and, therefore, to its economic and national security. US-CERT 
has a very important responsibility to analyze and reduce cyber threats and vulnerabilities, dissemi-
nate cyber threat warning information, and coordinate incident response activities. They collaborate 
with other organizations like Federal agencies, the research community, private sector, state and local 
governments, and international organizations. By coordinating with different incident response centers 
using both classified and unclassified systems, US-CERT disseminates reasoned, critical and actionable 
cyber-security information to the public. (DHS Cyber Security, 2006)
The different collaboration efforts of US-CERT include:
•	 US-CERT Web Portal: Provides a secure web-based collaborative system to share sensitive 
cyber-related information with government and industry members. And secondly it provides the 
government, private sector, and public with information needed to improve US-CERT’s ability to 
protect information systems and infrastructures; includes information on current activity, events, 
resources, publications, and affiliates.
•	 National Cyber Alert System: Delivers targeted, timely, and actionable information to Americans, 
educating them on how to secure their own computer systems.
•	 National Cyber Response Coordination Group: Established in partnership with the Department 
of Defense and the Department of Justice; serves as the federal government’s principal interagency 
mechanism to coordinate efforts to respond to and recover from cyber incidents of national sig-
nificance.
•	 Government Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (GFIRST): Embodies a com-
munity of more than 50 incident response teams from various federal agencies working together 
to secure the federal government.
•	 US-CERT Einstein Program: Involves an automated process for collecting, correlating, analyzing, 
and sharing computer security information across the federal government to improve our Nation’s 
cyber situational awareness.
•	 Internet Health Service: Provides information about Internet activity to federal government 
agencies throughout the GFIRST community.
After the calamity caused by Hurricane Katrina, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) real-
ized that many critical infrastructure control systems were shutdown, damaged, or destroyed. Hence 
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they provided assistance to owners and operators in rebuilding and securely restarting those sensitive 
control systems. In order to assist control system owners, vendors, operators, and service providers in 
bringing control systems, and the sensitive processes and functions they monitor and manage, back into 
operation as safely and as securely as possible under the circumstances, the DHS US-CERT Control 
Systems Security Center (CSSC) compiled a set of items to consider when restarting and rebuilding 
control systems. (US-CERT, 2005)
ceO cOm linK for business roundtable ceOs
The Critical Emergency Operations Communications Link (CEO COM LINKSM) is a secure telephone 
communications system that will enable the nation’s top CEOs to enhance the protection of America’s 
employees, communities and infrastructure by communicating with leading government officials and 
each other about a threat or during national crises. This communication system links each of the Busi-
ness Roundtable’s 150 CEOS with the federal government to coordinate communication and facilitate 
effective response in times of crisis. Rapidly linking the private and public sectors during crisis can 
dramatically improve collaboration and effectiveness in enhancing homeland security. 
The CEO COM LINK, developed by Business Roundtable, is an essential tool that enables this col-
laboration prior to, during, and in the aftermath of a significant national crisis. CEOs are alerted that 
the system is being activated and dial in to a secure conference call number. Each caller goes through a 
multi-step authentication process to ensure that only authorized participants are on the call. The calls also 
would allow CEOs to ask questions or share information with government leaders and with each other. 
Business rules have been established to govern calls and handle sensitive information (BRT, 2003).
Security is of utmost importance to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of information being 
shared. A critical security component is authentication. Each CEO is issued a means of authentication 
(e.g., voiceprints, caller ID), so a caller’s identity can be verified. Because the private sector owns or oper-
ates 90 percent of our nation’s critical infrastructures – including airlines, railroads, financial markets, 
telecommunications services and information services – CEO leadership in combating terrorist threats is 
critical to America’s security. A timely and effective exchange of information between government and 
the private sector – and among business leaders – is critical for our nation’s ability to detect additional 
threats, maintain homeland security, and respond effectively to threats or disasters.
Government emergency telecommunications service (Gets)
GETS is a White House directed emergency phone service provided by the National Communications 
System through the Department of Homeland Security. GETS provides emergency access and priority 
processing in local and long distance in the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). It provides 
Federal, State and local government National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) users with 
a ubiquitous switched voice and voice-band data communications service and is used during periods of 
natural or man-made disasters or emergencies that cause congestion or network outages. 
Different imperatives of GETS are:
•	 Access Authorization: GETS access control is accomplished through the use of Personal Identifi-




•	 Enhanced Routing: GETS calls use extensive enhancements to the PSTN’s robust network of 
interconnecting paths between switches. With these enhancements to the grid of multiple switch 
connections, GETS calls can still be connected without any disruptions even when numerous 
switch failures occur in the PSTN. 
•	 Priority Treatment: GETS allows that a high probability call identifier can be carried across the 
signaling network and used to trigger priority features such as trunk queuing and trunk reserva-
tion for designated emergency management communications. 
european network and information security agency (enisa)
The objective of ENISA is to improve network and information security in the European Union. The 
agency has to contribute to the development of a culture of network and information security for the 
benefit of the citizens, consumers, enterprises and public sector organizations of the European Union, 
and consequently will contribute to the smooth functioning of the EU Internal Market.
Different tasks done by ENISA are:
•	 Collect appropriate information to analyze current and emerging network and information security 
risks and provide the results of the analysis to Member States and the Commission;
•	 Provide advice and, if appropriate, assistance within its objectives to the European Parliament, 
the Commission and other competent bodies;
•	 Enhance cooperation between the different players in the sector (e.g., by organizing collaboration 
links between enterprises and universities) and facilitating cooperation between the Commission 
and the Member States in the development of common methodologies to prevent security prob-
lems;
•	 Contribute to awareness raising and the availability of rapid, objective and comprehensive informa-
tion on network and information security issues for all users. This can be achieved by promoting 
exchanges of best current practice, including methods of alerting users;
•	 Assist the Commission and the Member States in their dialogue with industry to address security 
related problems in hardware and software products;
•	 Track the development of standards for security products and services and promote risk assessment 
activities;
•	 Contribute to Community efforts to cooperate with third countries and international organizations 
to promote a global common approach to security issues.
